Business and Economy Class Shareholding

There is what the hard working Kenya Power technicians fix on the ground. Then there is what the hard working Kenya Power owners fix up there in the rarefied ownership air. Last Tuesday October 17th, Kenya Power issued a press release on the platform formerly known as Twitter. Headed “Kenya Power moves to change board composition to reflect the company’s shareholding structure,” the accompanying statement was an eye watering, 50 megawatts of rapid fire shuffling of a governance deck of cards. The usual sweet nothings prevailed: “to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders in line with good corporate governance standards…” was the first red flag for me. A company that regularly switches up its billing methodology depending on what side of Greedywich Mean Time it woke up that morning is not one that will safeguard anyone. Ever.

The press statement gave a heads up about an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) coming up with an agenda to amend the memorandum and articles of association. This was in order to, and I quote KPLC, “The amendments provide a mechanism for appointing Directors in a manner that proportionately reflects the Company’s shareholding structure. Currently, the Government holds 50.09% of the Company’s shares. In the proposed restructuring, the Government, who is the majority shareholder, will appoint five directors while the remaining shareholders will elect four directors.”

Now it gets very interesting. The government, with a majority thinner than a mosquito’s proboscis, was looking to protect minority shareholders by appointing five directors to the minority’s four? The author of the press statement had been thoroughly set up to write a telenovela script. So when the company put out a full page advertisement two days later with the EGM notice, I sipped a cup of very hot tea and slowly read each special resolution proposed in this carefully scripted act.

The amendments to the articles will create two classes of shares. Class A shares or economy class in the governance Boeing 787 Dreamliner to be held by the hoi polloi and Class B shares or business class to be held by the National Treasury. While both classes get to the same destination in terms of rights and privileges, economy class A shares are entitled to elect four directors. The business Class B shares are entitled to appoint the balance of the directors. Elect versus appoint. That is the class difference.

I do not want to impute mischief in the intentions of the press statement’s author, but the proposed amendment to Article 96 of the company’s articles states that “the directors shall be not less than seven and not more than ten in number.” Why would the press statement say that the government would appoint five directors, when the articles clearly provide that they can appoint up to six directors? Legally speaking, if these changes pass, shareholders at the next annual general meeting will only have the power to elect four directors. The government will have a right to appoint up to six directors, or the “balance”. What this does is to protect the government appointment directors from being rotated out of the board during an AGM. And yet the same full page notice of changes includes article 96 (B) that says the composition of the Board shall comprise a number of directors which fairly reflects the company’s shareholding structure. Since Article 96 provides for up to ten directors, I don’t think a 60:40 director split reflects a fair split for a shareholder who owns 50.09%. Fluff. Period.

It gets even more interesting. The chief executive officer of Kenya Power in the past has also been a managing director, meaning he has a seat on the board of directors. For some listed companies, executive directors are usually exempted from going through the vagaries of election at AGMs through express exemption clauses in the articles. Going forward will the CEO’s directorship be elected or appointed? I went to the governance section of the KPLC website and found  hastily and very poorly scanned board charter and board manual documents. There was no sign of the existing articles. According to section 2.4 (iv) of the soon to be re-written board manual, all directors are supposed to submit themselves to election at the AGM every three years. So will the managing director be elected by shareholders to take up one of their “fairly distributed” four seats on the board? Or will he be appointed by the majority shareholder? What these changes are purporting to do is ensure the majority shareholder’s directors have guaranteed seats on the board, while inelegantly controlling the appointment of the managing director who is quite likely the missing sixth director in the press statement.

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Twitter: @carolmusyoka

Board Directors Do Not Have X-Ray Vision

[vc_row][vc_column width=”2/3″][vc_column_text]Have you visited ABC Place on Waiyaki Way? If you happen to be driving there you first arrive at a poorly designed ticketing booth, maneuvering your car to an impossible angle that will enable the driver’s window to align with the knob you need to press in order for a parking ticket to emerge. Having just missed scraping the ticketing booth with the front bumper, you lurch forward and find polite but firm security guards who do a car search. These astute and fairly discerning gentlemen request you to open your door, open all the passenger doors, throw a bleary eye into the glove compartment and subject the boot of your car to a physical search. Once done, they will cheerily wave you off. Wait. If you have a handbag, or any other bag in your car, they will not subject it to an internal search since handbags in cars purportedly do not present clear and present danger. So the other day I take a taxi to ABC Place and as we are approaching the vehicular entrance via the deceleration lane, the taxi driver politely asks if I can disembark before he drives in. Why, I ask? He says that if he drives me inside he will have to pay for parking even for the 2 minutes it would take for me to haul myself out. Being of reasonable extraction, I obliged him and stepped out and watched him fishtail out of there in relief. I walked in as if to enter and those usually polite-because-I’m-in-a-car security guards stopped short of baring their teeth at me. I was informed in no uncertain terms that pedestrians have their own entrance, round the back towards the parking exit. I tottered all the way back towards said entrance and had to go through a turnstile, handbag search and security black magic wand over my body. I learnt a valuable lesson that day. Security threats via individuals are to be found more from pedestrians with handbags than occupants of motor vehicles.

Why do I narrate this long and unnecessary soliloquy? Boards of Directors are often managed in a similar manner. I have avoided commenting on the Imperial Bank saga largely because it is difficult to fathom and erroneous to paint a broad brush of culpability on the entire board of directors. It is always an enormous reputational risk that individuals assume when agreeing to join any governance board as they are lending their name to the purported governance mechanisms that the organization subscribes to. To the outsider, a board denotes oversight and accountability and a safe pair of hands that stakeholders have entrusted to protect the organization from unfettered management excesses. But the directors as a collective are in exactly the same position as the security guards at ABC Place. They open doors and check the boot and glove compartment, seeing as much as is physically possible with the naked eye.

The pedestrian body search is done at board committee meetings. Greater detail is discussed and more time is spent with management in understanding the scope of financial and operational issues that the organization encounters. But it is critical to note that the operating system of any institution, just like the engine of a car, can be compromised and it would take a forensic investigation or Oketch your car mechanic to open it up and figure out why that catalytic converter light keeps coming on when your driving at 87 km/h. The management of any organization is the actual owner of the business while shareholders are just owners of capital. The management can deliver or destroy value. Management can aim to execute with integrity but still have a few bad apples that sing from a fraudulent hymn sheet against which tight internal controls and compliance should ideally act as a gatekeeper.

Board directors see what the owners (read management) of the car want them to see. A clean boot, an empty glove compartment and a sparkling interior. The engine may be compromised but the car is running smoothly, or so they think. No smoking gun, no grenades. As a director, you only see what management wants you to see. You can ask questions – very hard questions- but if a (manipulated) system generates legitimate reports that are used to guide board oversight then raking directors over hot coals for poor oversight is placing them in a difficult position. Directors spend less than 3 days a quarter providing oversight on a company’s operations. They do not have access to any of the operating systems, nor should they have. They do not have signing powers over any of the bank accounts, nor should they have. But they do carry a heavy responsibility to ask the right questions and demand audits or deeper external investigation where they get a sense that something is not right.

Now if those that are charged with undertaking those external audits are themselves compromised, then the board’s goose is collectively cooked. I have had the pleasure to professionally engage with audit firms during various board assignments. The role of the auditor is to review the processes with which the financial accounts have been generated, to test the assumptions being made by management as well as to interrogate the inputs into the system and the outputs therefrom. If that system has been compromised at the highest level, you’d need the x-ray vision that our security guards are purported to have to assess handbags in cars. A lot of responsibility is placed on audit firms to be all seeing and all knowing. Collectively heaping blame on auditors whose mandate cannot cover running end-to-end tests of all transactions passed is a flawed abrogation of duty. Whose duty is it then? Is it the board, which only comes in four times a year to provide oversight? Is it the shareholders, who have delegated oversight authority to the board and only come together during the annual general meeting? Or is it management who, in actual truth, are the true owners of the business?

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Twitter: @carolmusyoka[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][vc_column width=”1/3″][/vc_column][/vc_row]