The Road To Economic Hell Is Littered With Good Intentions

“The road to a Kenyan hell is paved with good intentions” – Anonymous Parliamentarian

The IMF recently released a report titled “First Review of Kenya Under Stand By Credit Facility” in which a review of the effect of the interest rates capping on the Kenyan economy was undertaken. And it confirmed the warning that was consistently given by economists and bankers alike in the period leading to the signing of the interest rate capping bill in August 2016: Wanjiku is not getting loans from the banking industry. But we all knew that was going to happen, didn’t we? Perhaps I should define the “we” as those that were not drunk with the giddy excitement that parliamentarians had infected across credit addicted Kenyans: a fatal assumption that banks could be tamed by legislation into giving Wanjiku more money for less interest. The IMF report states and I quote, “International experience, however, shows that such controls are ineffective and can have significant unintended consequences. These would ultimately lead to lower economic growth and undermine efforts to reduce poverty. In addition, linking deposit and lending rates to the policy rate limits the central bank’s capacity to maintain price stability and support sustainable economic growth.”

In Wanjiku-speak, the IMF tells us that central banks globally are responsible for the monetary policy of countries. They use interest rate tools to increase or decrease money supply in the country in order to manage inflation and stimulate economic growth. In Kenya, that tool has been the Central Bank Rate (CBR). Now when that tool is used as a benchmark to lend money at the same rate to both platinum and God-knows-if-they’ll-repay-us borrowers, the obvious tendency will be to cut off the latter like the gangrenous arm that they are. Here’s an example. Jim runs the supermarket at the corner. You’ve watched him start that business from a small 100 square feet shop at the shopping centre to 5,000 square feet of retail space. He comes to you for a bridging loan as his bank has accepted to give him a loan but there’s a bit of paperwork that has to be completed. He expects to repay you when the bank credits his account in the next two weeks. Peter, who lives across the road from you, is a habitual drunk and has been fired three times in the last five years. He wants you to loan him some money and promises to repay you when he receives his salary, since he now has a new job. Who will you lend to and why? Before the interest rate caps, if you were flush with cash you would lend to Jim at say 15% and were happy to extend that loan to a year because you knew that he would repay it with the cash flows from his business, even if the bank loan didn’t come through. You might have considered lending to Peter, but at 30%, a higher rate to mitigate for the higher default risk. You also give him short repayment tenor of one month, as you know he may be fired any time.

What the interest rate capping has done is to force the banks to lend to both Jim and Peter at the same rate. And in most third world economies, there are more Peters than there are Jims in terms of quality borrowers, meaning that there will be more banks chasing fewer quality loans. Furthermore, by using the CBR as the benchmark, it has forced the Central Bank to be very cautious in how it uses that tool for monetary operations. If it drops the CBR, it causes bank interest rates to drop from an already precipitously low rate to an unsustainable level. Whatever little lending is occurring already will simply come to a shuddering halt. The interest rate capping law essentially forced the Central Bank to play football with both hands tied behind its back.

The Central Bank issues a quarterly report titled The Credit Officer Survey and is used to establish the lending behavior in the banking sector. The report is issued at the end of every quarter and essentially requests banks to submit information on eleven economic sectors on items like credit standards for approving loans, demand for credit and interest rates amongst others. The last published report is for September 2016, and I am assuming that the department responsible for its publishing is crossing the T’s and dotting the I’s in what will most certainly be a revealing December 2016 report. The Q3 survey showed that demand for credit increased in the Trade, Personal/Household and Real Estate sectors compared to the previous quarters. In other words, your entrepreneurs, salaried payroll check off workers and homebuyers were borrowing more in that particular quarter. But it wouldn’t be for long.

As I couldn’t get the biblical truth in the form of the Q4 report, I decided to do a soft survey in my networks within three Tier 1 banks in Kenya. All three banks had virtually stopped unsecured lending in the SME sectors. All three banks had also stopped salary check off loans unless they had express agreements with the corporate employers where the banks were handling the payroll. In simple words, your entrepreneurs and your salaried workers are not getting loans as much as they used to. One bank said that for the first time in memory, they had negative growth in their loan book: the monthly loan repayments outstripped new loan drawdowns, which simply means that their loan book was shrinking. In the Q3 Central Bank report, total loans to total assets had slightly reduced by 2% from 61.16% to 59.17% from the preceding quarter. You should expect this reduction to be significantly higher in the Q4 report as the asset mix moves in favor of short-term government assets.

Parliament can try and legislate interest rates, but they cannot legislate appetite. Banks cannot be forced to lend, they can only be encouraged to do so via central bank driven monetary policy incentives. Parliament may have had the best intentions, but they’ve created an economic hell. Once the shine has worn off the cheap bauble that is the interest capping law, the glaring truth has been revealed. The impact will be devastating to the Kenyan economy.

The Unintended Consequences Of The Banking Amendment Act 2015

[vc_row][vc_column width=”2/3″][vc_column_text]Wednesday, August 24th 2016 will go down in history as the day Kenyans collectively chose to wet their whistles prematurely, in celebration of the Presidential assent of the Banking Bill (Amendment) 2015. But who can blame their souls that were weary from years of punitive interest rates in a regime where demand for credit by far outstripped supply?

Let me begin from the beginning. Banks take your deposits and in turn lend these out to borrowers who range from individuals borrowing unsecured loans on the back of a salary check off program, to small, medium and large businesses borrowing to finance their working capital needs or capital expenditure purchases, and who secure these facilities with a piece of property or equipment. But the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), like any good regulator who wants to protect depositors, sets out the amount of capital that the shareholders of the bank need to maintain, in order to lend to these various types of borrowers with varied risk levels. The requirement for capital is literally to ensure that banks have “skin in the game” effectively causing banks to exercise caution in lending out customer deposits (which then become assets on the bank’s books) to entities that have demonstrated the ability to repay.

So the next time you throw a cursory glance at your bank’s financial statements, cross over to the bottom, a fairly innocuous section called “Other Disclosures” and particularly the section titled “Capital Strength”. This, good people, is where the rubber meets the road. There’s one line, usually section (f) titled Total Risk Weighted Assets. CBK requires banks to allocate capital to all the assets on their books. But different assets attract different amounts of capital. So, for instance loans to the central government via treasury bills and bonds attract a zero capital charge. The same applies to loans guaranteed by the central government as well as OECD governments. If the regular borrower, Wanjiku, also wants to give 100% cash collateral for her loan, that attracts a zero charge as well.

By the way I’m quoting from the CBK Prudential Guidelines, a document whose detail is so technical that it is recommended reading for anyone having trouble falling asleep at night. The flip side is painful: lending to anyone else – be they an individual who’s provided their Sunday best clothes as security or a corporate whose provided a prime Mombasa road property as collateral – attracts 100% capital charge. So a bank has to allocate 100% of its capital (on a weight adjusted basis) which as you know is a finite and fairly expensive resource, for your loan. It may interest you to know that mortgages which are well secured and performing only attract a 50% capital charge. Why you ask? Shelter features fairly high under Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, therefore risk of default is much lower.

Because of how much capital a bank has allocate to a loan, it’s much easier to simply place deposits in government paper. But low risk means low returns and banks have therefore taken the fairly lucrative business of lending to individuals, SMEs and corporates which are higher risk, require higher capital charges but which capital charges are resoundingly compensated by high interest returns.

However, let’s call a spade a spade. Banks in Kenya have been smug and lazy. Since demand outstrips supply, they have chosen to treat all borrowers the same. Wanjiku who has borrowed 20 loans in the last thirty years, servicing all of them well without a single default, is charged the same 19% rate as Paul, who just got his first job at a government parastatal and can use his payslip to get a check off loan to buy furniture for his new apartment. The insurance industry is willing to give Wanjiku a no-claims bonus, which is a reduction on her annual insurance policy for her car as a reward for not having any accidents in the past year. But the banking industry wants to treat Wanjiku as if her good repayment record doesn’t deserve a reward. The reduction in interest rates will force banks to do one of two things: move out of higher risk rated assets as the returns will not be commensurate with the capital charge and secondly, begin to provide much needed granularity in the way they have chosen who to lend to based on positive credit reference bureau ratings. I’ve beaten that granularity drum before, but I’m not about to get tired. Good borrowers do not warrant the high interest rates that are currently being charged to cover (lazy) banks from bad borrowers. Enough said.

In these dying column minutes let me draw your attention to one thing: the Banking (Amendment) Bill 2015 was horrendously drafted and has as many holes as my grandmother’s favorite crochet table cover. Section 33B (1) and (2) refer to a base rate set by Central Bank of Kenya. The media is using the Central Bank Rate which is a rate used by CBK to loan to banks and is NOT a base rate for lending to the public. Of course this can be cured when the CBK publishes the regulations required to operationalize the Act, by creating such a base rate which can be set wherever CBK feels is the right point including aligning it to the Kenya Bankers Reference Rate. Secondly, Section 33B (2) refers to “minimum interest rate granted to a deposit held in interest earning to at least 70% the base rate”. There seems to be a missing word there after interest earning, perhaps the drafter meant to put the word “account”. Whatever the case, the regulations will now have to prescribe what a “deposit” means for purposes of Section 33B (2). Chances are that to enable stability in the banking sector, a deposit will have to be an amount placed for a contractual period rather than just any amount in an interest bearing account (such as a savings account). The result is that banks will set up minimum amounts for which they are willing to enter into “deposit” contracts, perhaps from Kes 50 million and above to justify that high interest rate payable. Finally, if banks move to lending to GoK rather than to Wanjiku, the treasury bills and bond rates will decline dramatically and institutional investors such as pension funds will see a significant drop in their returns, meaning their pensioners will also suffer. Such are the unintended consequences of this Bill.

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